2. We have studied articles about women. Our bibliography only partially overlaps, but is distinct from the set of articles written by women.
3. Polity is more like the journals in Cluster C in its decade of first publication, patterns of article publication, time-frame when the majority of articles appeared, and journal audience, and hence was placed in that category. The content of PAR articles more closely resembles the content of articles in Cluster D, and thus was included in that cluster.
4 Percentage differences in rejection rates across six of these eight fields were generally trivial-from 71% to 83%. Rejection rates outside (and below) this range were found for Political Philosophy (57%) and Methodology (42%), implying that these areas are more likely to have success. However, this implication is misleading; the cell entries are too small (8 and 10, respectively) to infer that these are favored specialties. Rather, the overall conclusion is that papers from different fields fare about equally.
With respect to H3, the School hypothesis, there is a small correlation (r = .17) between author affiliation with a Top 20 Political Science Department (0 = no, 1 = yes) and editorial decision ( -1 = reject, 0 = revise and resubmit, 1 = accept). With regard to H4, on Timing, there might be a little seasonality. At the extremes, 27% of the papers submitted in the fall (N = 64) received a revise-and-submit or an acceptance, whereas in the spring (N = 117), the comparable figure was just 17%. Still, this ten percentage point difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. In reality, an author submitting in any season would face odds that were essentially the same.
Finally sions, authors received a decision, on average, just under two-and-a-half months after the manuscript was logged in at the Iowa office. (The standard deviation around that value was one month.) When turnaround time (in months) is correlated with editorial decision, r = .02, there is virtually no linear relationship. Thus, for the expectant author, early news should not be considered more likely to be bad (or good) than later news.
Good Predictors of Manuscript Acceptance
The data lend little support for the foregoing five hypotheses on publication success. However, two remaining hypotheses receive considerable support. Along with the manuscript itself, the substantive comments of reviewCorrelates of Publication Success ers are the stuff from which the editorial decision is made. In addition to providing extensive written comments, each reviewer is asked to fill out the' 'AlPS Manuscript Rating Form." (These forms do not go to authors.) These ratings may provide a partial, quantitative assessment useful for testing H6. The reviewer rates the quality of the manuscript on the following items: We expect these rating scores to reflect, strongly if imperfectly, the assessments in the reviewer's extended substantive comments on the manuscript. Therefore, since the editor relies on these substantive comments, we also would expect actual editorial decision outcomes naturally to correlate strongly with these ratings. And they do. That is, for Publish Scale, r = .54; Contribution, r = .52; Advice, r = .51; Breadth, r = .29. Let us explore the first three, the strongest correlates, in more detail.
With regard to the Publish Scale (the 0-10 point rating), once papers pass the "7" mark (an average over the usual three reviewers), the chances are better than 50-50 that the paper receives either an accept or a revise-and-resubmit. At the other end, if the paper rates no more than a "3," chances are about 900/0 or better that it is to be rejected. Similarly, with the Contribution variable, 53% of those scoring "high" were accepted, while none of the papers scoring "none" were accepted. This is strong evidence that, as we had expected, reviewers' opinions make an important difference.
The impact of reviewer opinion is seen clearly in Table 1 , where the last variable, reviewer "yes" or "no" vote on publication, is related to editorial decision. On the one hand, when reviewers collectively judged that the paper rated a rejection, that was the actual decision 89.7% of the time. On the other hand, when reviewers judged that the paper should be accepted, that corresponded to an acceptance, or at least a revise-and-resubmit, 54.5% of the time. 
-For each paper, the responses to the dichotomous vote item (see text, "yes" = accept; "no" = reject) were averaged for the (typically) three reviewers, giving a single vote score for each paper. (If the average was less than .5, then it was coded "0" for the paper as a whole; if the average was .5 or more, then it was coded" I" for the paper as a whole.)
As potent as reviewer opinion is, the table implies that it is not invariably followed. Most notably, 45.5% of the papers where, on balance, the reviewers voted "yes" were actually rejected. This finding lends support to H7, suggesting the editor may exercise some independent judgment. It is tempting to take a normative stance on this issue-should an editor exercise his or her own judgment? For the editor, however, this independence is foremostly practical, 560 due to the exigencies of page restrictions.
The marginals of Table 1 average value on the 0-10 Publish Scale variable of 6 or greater.) Each issue, then, would be about triple in size, and costs would multiply accordingly. Obviously, nowhere near that much journal space is likely to become available soon. Thus, the AlPS editor, like the editors of other major political science journals, is forced by page constraints alone to make yet another quality cut through the papers, reading over the reviews and manuscripts again before making a final decision.
Conclusion
Reviewer opinion, as expected, is a good predictor of publication success at AlPS. In following reviewer advice, the editor acts as a "delegate," making decisions on the basis of constituency opinion. However, the editor cannot act solely as a "delegate" of the reviewers. First, reviewers are only part of the constituency. (Besides, there are journal readers, Midwest Association members, researchers, and students, many of whom may not do reviews.) Second, even if reviewers are considered the primary constituency, the standard sample of three reviewers per paper cannot be counted on to estimate perfectly the opinion parameter in the reviewer population. (No matter how carefully the editor sifts substantive reviewer comments, the tiny N problem persists. And, significantly increasing the number of reviewers poses its own difficulties.) Third, supposing reviewer opinions were representative estimates, the journal's space constraints demand that the editor exercise independent judgment. In exercising this independence, the editor acts as a "trustee," carrying out decisions under the burden of responsibility the term implies. [Of course, in the political science literature, the "delegatetrustee" distinction can be traced back to the classic of Wahlke et al. (1962).] There is, then, a "paradox of editorship." On the one hand, an editor serves as a reviewer "delegate," on the other, as a "trustee" for the larger political science community. As we have seen, these two roles do not always pull the editor in the same direction. [The recent AlPS paper by Sigelman et al. (1992) nicely articulates this paradox at the level of elected officials.] Whether the paradox finds a satisfactory collective resolution seems to depend, ultimately, on the quality of the decisions made. That is to say, how good are the papers that are published? The measurement of publication quality is no easy task. However, AlPS supporters should take heart, for the journal consistently performs at or near the top of the various quality ratings that have been conducted. [In addition to the recent Crewe and Norris (1991) , see Garand (1990) , Giles et al. (1989) , and Lester (1990) .]
